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B.

IV.

I. Introduction
October Term 2017 produced a dizzying slate of contentious free-speech
cases.1 Starting in the early 20th century, the Supreme Court began to craft and
shape the concepts of what free speech would entail in a modern society.2 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. exposited in 1919 that while “[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic,”3 in the typical case, “the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”4 Justice
Louis D. Brandeis espoused a few years later that “[i]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”5 Fastforward to the 21st century, these comments seem quaint. In the past ten years,
we learned that robust free-speech rights exist for corporations,6 videographers of

1
See, e.g., James Coppess, Symposium: Four Propositions that Follow from Janus, SCOTUS(June 28, 2018, 2:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-fourpropositions-that-follow-from-janus/; Alice O’Brien, Symposium: Janus’ Radical Rewrite of the First
Amendment, SCOTUSblog (June 27, 2018, 9:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/
symposium-janus-radical-rewrite-of-the-first-amendment/; Richard Epstein, Symposium: The Worst
Form of Judicial Minimalism—Masterpiece Cakeshop Deserved a Full Vindication for Its Claims of
Religious Liberty and Free Speech, SCOTUSblog (June 4, 2018, 8:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2018/06/symposium-the-worst-form-of-judicial-minimalism-masterpiece-cakeshopdeserved-a-full-vindication-for-its-claims-of-religious-liberty-and-free-speech/.

blog

2
Supreme Court Landmark Case: Schenck v. United States (C-SPAN television broadcast
Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?327714-1/supreme-court-landmark-case-schenck-vunited-states [https://archive.org/details/CSPAN3_20151103_020000_Supreme_Court_
Landmark_Case_Schenck_v._United_States.].
3

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

4

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

5

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

6

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010).
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animal cruelty,7 funeral protestors,8 liars of military service,9 and internet-surfing
sex offenders.10
October Term 2017 undulated free-speech precedents by asking the Court
to decide whether wedding cakes could constitute protected speech,11 states
could compel public employees to pay union fees,12 and pro-life organizations
could resist mandatory-disclosure obligations about state-funded abortion
services.13 The Court also considered—albeit tangentially—how far a president
can go before his words can be used against him to prove animus.14 With the
Court either divided 5–4,15 or unable to reach a consensus on the free-speech
question,16 Justice Kagan laid bare her frustration: “The First Amendment was
meant for better things.”17 Reflecting on October Term 2017 and its portents,
some lamented that the best approach is to “settle in”18 because “Winter
is Coming.”19
The Court also decided that term Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida,
which broke from the high-profile, divisive cases and returned to cardinal aspects
of the First Amendment articulated first by Justices Holmes and Brandeis almost
one hundred years ago.20 In November 2006, Fane Lozman rose to speak during
the public-comments portion of a regular meeting of the city council of Riviera

7

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).

8

See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011).

See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (“Although the statute covers
respondent’s speech, the Government argues that it leaves breathing room for protected speech, for
example speech which might criticize the idea of the Medal or the importance of the military. The
Government’s arguments cannot suffice to save the statute.”).
9

10

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1723 (2018).
11

12

See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018).

13

See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“The First
Amendment prohibits the establishment of religion and promises the free exercise of religion. From
these safeguards, and from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows there is freedom of belief
and expression.”).
14

15

See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459.

16

See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

17

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

First Mondays Podcast, The Annual: OT2017 in Review, SCOTUSblog at 00:13:30 (July 9,
2018, 9:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/the-annual-ot2017-in-review/.
18

19

Game of Thrones: Winter is Coming (HBO television broadcast Apr. 17, 2011).

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20
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Beach, Florida.21 When Lozman began to talk about corrupt local politicians,
he was cut off by a councilperson and asked to stop speaking.22 Upon refusal
to comply, he was arrested, handcuffed, and removed from the meeting.23 In
2008, Lozman brought a civil-rights lawsuit against the city, alleging retaliatory
arrest for his exercise of free speech.24 Although not cited or relied on during the
arrest or consideration of charges, a district court in 2014 dismissed the lawsuit
because probable cause to arrest may have existed under a latent state law, which
“prohibits interruptions or disturbances in schools, churches, or other public
assemblies.”25 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in
2017.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “on the issue whether the existence
of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.”27
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in his penultimate majority opinion in an
argued case, concluded in a 7–1 decision that vacatur and remand was appropriate because “Lozman need not prove the absence of probable cause to maintain
a claim of retaliatory arrest against the City.”28 Justice Kennedy described the issue
decided as “a narrow one” because the appeal did not challenge “the constitution
ality of Florida’s statute criminalizing disturbances at public assemblies.”29 Perhaps
had Lozman done so, he could have succeeded on the merits in striking down a
law that stymied his ability to participate in local government.
Although Justice Kagan did not provide examples of the “better” aspects
of the First Amendment to which she alluded,30 it would be hard to argue that
protecting people from a government policy of censorship and restraint is not
salutary.31 Something so axiomatic reminds that, while some may disagree about
whether special-interest groups are now “weaponizing the First Amendment” for
deregulation,32 the best parts of the First Amendment remain as a redoubt against
silencing political dissent.
21

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (Lozman V ), 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1949 (2018).

22

See id.

23

See id. at 1950.

24

See id.

25

See id. (citation omitted).

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (Lozman IV ), 681 F. App’x 746, 748 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“Lozman claimed his arrest violated the First and Fourth Amendments, and constituted a false
arrest under Florida state law. The case was tried before a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the City on all claims. Lozman appeals (1) the district court’s denial of his motion for new trial,
and (2) various instructions the district court gave the jury. After careful review, we affirm.”).
26

27

Lozman V, 138 S. Ct. at 1951.

28

Id. at 1955.

29

Id. at 1951.

30

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

31

See id.

32

Id. at 2501.
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This Article argues that the lawsuit filed by Fane Lozman teaches what
free speech, at its core, is about and how similarly situated cases can win on
multiple fronts. The Article first chronicles the contentious free-speech cases
decided during October Term 2017.33 It then discusses Lozman and explains why
optimism should exist that future cases will succeed on the merits and in the
court of public opinion.34 Certainly Justices Holmes and Brandeis could not have
foreseen how speech would be implicated by restrictions on campaign financing,
video content, or safe spaces and trigger warnings in classrooms. Yet much of
the contemporary conversation and litigation about free speech touches on how
far to push an individual’s freedom of choice in all areas of life.35
Lost in this search, and what Lozman helps find, is the idea that freedom is
abiding so long as the government relents and enables everyone to listen and learn
the truth. Framed against the brooding omnipresence of a law used to circum
scribe political discussion, Lozman reminds that legal options exist to access and
petition government officials.36 So to instantiate what Justice Kagan might have
intended when suggesting that “[t]he First Amendment was meant for better
things,” courts and advocates need only look to and rediscover the past.37 Lozman
is a filigree of a bygone era when the concerns animating the First Amendment
were the discovery of “truth”38 to propel “deliberative”39 democratic processes.
Erstwhile aspirations, then, can still have meaning today. And, as Lozman shows,
the First Amendment can still embody the search for truth and deliberation.

II. The Free-Speech Fissures Exposed During October Term 2017
The apparent frustrations among the justices over free speech at the conclu
sion of October Term 2017 rest, in part, on the genesis behind and development
of the Court’s working hypothesis of what is speech and how free should it be.

33

See infra notes 39 –135 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 136 –249 and accompanying text.

Richard M. Re, Tribute: Seeing Justice Kennedy Think, SCOTUSblog (June 29, 2018,
10:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/tribute-seeing-justice-kennedy-think/ (“But at
the end of perhaps the most influential judicial career in a century, Kennedy deserves respect and
our best efforts at understanding. And I think he will ultimately receive both. Kennedy represents a
distinctive judicial philosophy marked by two words: freedom and dignity. Those values are united
for Kennedy in that each requires and demands the other. To lead a dignified life is to speak,
worship, work and love freely. Other values, including equality, responsibility, and, yes, civility are
all important but derivative. Kennedy wants choice first, even if it means choices that go wrong.”).
35

36

Lozman V, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2018).

37

See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

38

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

39

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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A. What the Past Century Has Taught About Free Speech
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.”40 Although the First Amendment says “Congress,” the
Supreme Court has concluded that speakers are protected against the entire
panoply of governmental agencies and actors, whether federal, state, local,
legislative, executive, or judicial.41 A blank space existed in this area until the early
20th century, at which time the Court awoke from its reticence and began to
expound on the First Amendment.42
In Schenck v. United States, the case to which many scholars point as the
landmark beginning of free-speech jurisprudence,43 the Court addressed a freespeech challenge to the Espionage Act of 1917, which the government used to
convict Charles Schenck and others of distributing anti-war leaflets in an effort
to conspire against the recruiting and enlistment of military service members.44
In a unanimous opinion, Justice Holmes upheld the convictions, first observing
that “in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was
said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights.”45 He then
pivoted, explaining “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances
in which it is done.”46 “The most stringent protection of free speech,” he warned,
“would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic.”47
Roughly eight months later, in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes,
with whom Justice Brandeis joined, dissented from an opinion that affirmed
convictions under the same federal law for anti-war protests committed under
similar circumstances.48 The trial court refused to entertain extensive discovery

40

U.S. Const. amend. I.

See Geoffrey R. Stone & Eugene Volokh, A Common Interpretation: Freedom of Speech
and the Press, Nat’l Const. Ctr.: Const. Daily (Dec. 1, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/
blog/a-common-interpretation-freedom-of-speech-and-the-press (“But starting in the 1920s, the
Supreme Court began to read the First Amendment more broadly, and this trend accelerated in the
1960s. Today, the legal protection offered by the First Amendment is stronger than ever before in
our history.”).
41

42

See Supreme Court Landmark Case, supra note 2.

See id.; Amy E. Feldman, First Amendment Limits: Is ‘Bingo’ the New ‘Fire’?, Nat’l Const.
Ctr.: Const. Daily (Mar. 29, 2013), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/first-amendment-limitsis-bingo-the-new-fire (“One of the seminal cases to the understanding of free speech rights involved
a man named Charles Schenck, who was chairman of the U.S. Socialist Party.”).
43

44

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).

45

Id. at 52.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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before entering judgment because the protests were mere “soapbox advocacy”
inciting “hellish anarchy.”49 Justice Holmes retreated from Abrams, offering the
marketplace-of-ideas stimulus for future cases:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment.50
Some commentators consider this opinion “one of the most important dissents”
in Court history because of its recognition that truth is best discovered in an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas, which Judge Billings Learned Hand purportedly
influenced through sustained correspondence with Justice Holmes about the value
of “tolerance” in the aftermath of Schenck.51
A few years later, in Whitney v. California, the Court upheld a conviction
under a state law proscribing criminal syndicalism on grounds that barring
involvement with the Communist Labor Party of California did not violate due
process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Understood
through the developing lens of due process, the Court dismissed the notion that
the state law restrained a cognizable right of free speech:
That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution
does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled
license giving immunity for every possible use of language and
preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and
that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or

49
See Make No Law, The First Amendment Podcast: Fighting Faiths, Legal Talk Network
00:09:00 (July 27, 2018), https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/make-no-law/2018/07/fightingfaiths/ [hereinafter Fighting Faiths] (transcript available at URL).
50
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630; see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012)
(quoting and endorsing the marketplace-of-ideas concept from Abrams).
51

See Fighting Faiths, supra note 49, at 00:20:00.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (“We find no repugnancy in the
Syndicalism Act as applied in this case to either the due process or equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment on any of the grounds upon which its validity has been here challenged.”).
52
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endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten
its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.53
That the arguments focused on due process and equal protection—and only
addressed speech as a tertiary argument—demonstrates the nascent efficacy of
free-speech challenges around 1927.54
Justice Brandeis concurred, arguing that “valid restriction does not exist unless
speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger
of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent has
been settled.”55 Although Justice Brandeis concluded that evidence existed of a
conspiracy to commit “serious crimes,”56 he made clear his belief that “[t]hose
who won our independence by revolution were not cowards”; “[t]hey did not fear
political change”; and “[t]hey did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.”57
Justice Brandeis also exhorted in one long paragraph that more political
speech is better than less speech because only then can people reason against and
resist governmental coercion:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all
human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;

53

Id.

Id. (“We find no repugnancy in the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case to either the
due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on any of the grounds upon
which its validity has been here challenged.”).
54

55

Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

56

Id. at 380.

57

Id. at 377.
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that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.58
Fifty years later, the Warren Court captured the visions of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis.59 For example, in 1969, the Court permitted the Ku Klux Klan
to march because “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”60 That
same year, the Court permitted high-school students to protest the Vietnam War
by wearing black armbands in school so long as the conduct did not “materially
and substantially” interfere with school operations.61
The Rehnquist Court carried on where the Warren Court left off in the
context of free-speech rights.62 In 1989, flag burning became protected speech.63
In 1992, statutes prohibiting cross burning could not be justified as constitutional

58
Id. at 375–77; see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (citing
Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357 (1927), approvingly).

See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the
Warren Court, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 459, 460 (1997) (“The paradigmatic protection of individual
liberty is the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, which first received its most extensive
interpretations at the hands of the Warren Court.”); Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Floyd Abrams &
His Fighting Faith, SCOTUSblog (May 17, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/
ask-the-author-floyd-abrams-his-fighting-faith/ (“There are generally three situations in which the
government can constitutionally restrict speech under a less demanding standard. . . . I feel obliged
to add that an awful lot of academics who seemed unconcerned at (and even celebrated) the breadth
of many decisions of the Warren Court seem terribly preoccupied by the scope and procedural
history of Citizens United.”).
59

60
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 516 –17 (1951)).

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
61

See Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Paul Moke on Earl Warren—The Man & His Measure,
SCOTUSblog (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/ask-the-authorpaul-moke-on-earl-warren-the-man-his-measure/.
62

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (“We decline, therefore, to create for the
flag an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment.”).
63
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on the basis of preventing fighting words.64 And in 2002, the Court explained
that the government cannot prevent the creation of computer images depicting
sexually explicit images of children.65
The Roberts Court so far has festinated the inexorable progression of
free-speech rights.66 Under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
corporations achieved expansive free-speech rights,67 purveyors of videos of
women crushing animals and other depictions of extreme animal cruelty were
able to avoid criminal prosecution,68 protesters realized the right to brandish signs
proclaiming “God Hates Fags” and “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11”
outside of military funerals,69 individuals could lie with criminal impunity about
receiving military service medals,70 and convicted sex offenders gained the right
to access the internet in “the Cyber Age.”71 October Term 2017 added to these
precedents by examining freighted culture-war issues against what limits (if any)
exist on speech.

B. October Term 2017 and the Growing Pains of Free-Speech Protection
October Term 2017 produced both expected and curious outcomes in the
area of free speech, which ignited divisions among the justices about the types of
behavior for which the Constitution provides protection and those over which it
relinquishes control.72 Each opinion shows in almost raw detail how far the Court
has come in just one hundred years and how far it intends to go.

See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (“Let there be no mistake about our belief
that burning a cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its
disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.”).
64

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“The principal question to
be resolved, then, is whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe of
speech that is neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber.”).
65

Ronald Collins, The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, SCOTUSblog (July 9, 2013,
11:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/the-roberts-court-and-the-first-amendment/ (“By
that measure, the Roberts Court has sometimes enriched the First Amendment by way of
unprecedented protection, while at other times it has devalued the currency of that fundamental freedom.”).
66

67

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010).

68

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).

69

See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454, 459– 61 (2011).

See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (“Although the statute covers
respondent’s speech, the Government argues that it leaves breathing room for protected speech, for
example speech which might criticize the idea of the Medal or the importance of the military. The
Government’s arguments cannot suffice to save the statute.”).
70

71

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 –38 (2017).

72

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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1. Can Baking a Cake Constitute Protected Speech?
In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case
receiving much attention from the public and leading to five separate opinions,73
the Court left undecided—and largely untouched—the contours of when
protected expression begins as merchants sell commercial goods in the general
marketplace.74 The case involved an appeal from a Colorado state-court decision,
which concluded that refusing to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding
violated certain state laws against discrimination in the marketplace on the basis of
sexual orientation.75 The question presented was “[w]hether applying Colorado’s
public accommodations law to compel petitioner to create expression that violates
his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.”76 The Court ruled in favor of
the baker on the basis that certain state actors had expressed skepticism of the
baker’s religious sincerity, which bore “some elements of a clear and impermissible
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.”77
Although that case was decided on the basis that “laws be applied in a
manner that is neutral toward religion,”78 dueling concurring opinions authored
by Justice Kagan (joined by Justice Steven G. Breyer), and Justice Neil M. Gorsuch
(joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.), jousted over theories of what it would
take in future cases for specialty commercial goods to suddenly acquire
constitutional protection.79 Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch
73

Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Setting the Table for a Major Ruling, SCOTUS

blog (Dec. 5, 2017, 4:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/view-courtroom-setting-table-

major-ruling/.
74
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018)
(“The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The
free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake
might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example,
however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
deepen our understanding of their meaning.”).
75

Id. at 1723 –25.

Kate Howard, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 7, 2016, 11:23 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2016/09/petition-of-the-day-991/.
76

77

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.

78

Id. at 1732.

Compare id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring) (“But that is wrong. The cake requested
was not a special ‘cake celebrating same-sex marriage.’ It was simply a wedding cake—one that (like
other standard wedding cakes) is suitable for use at same-sex and opposite-sex weddings alike.”),
with id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Take the first suggestion first. To suggest that cakes
with words convey a message but cakes without words do not—all in order to excuse the bakers in
Mr. Jack’s case while penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational. Not even the Commission or court of
appeals purported to rely on that distinction. Imagine Mr. Jack asked only for a cake with a symbolic
expression against same-sex marriage rather than a cake bearing words conveying the same idea.
Surely the Commission would have approved the bakers’ intentional wish to avoid participating in
that message too.”).
79
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joined, staked out the most clear view of when commercial products can achieve
free-speech protection: “Phillips’ creation of custom wedding cakes is expressive”
because “[t]he cake’s purpose is to mark the beginning of a new marriage and
to celebrate the couple.”80 Those justices therefore seemed to abide that makers
of custom products in the general marketplace are entitled to some measure
of free-speech protection. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that any general commercial decision “not [to]
provide a good or service to a same-sex couple that [the seller] would provide
to a heterosexual couple” constitutes unprotected activity.81 That no consensus
emerged is emblematic of the deep fissures in how to approach new theories of
protected speech.

2. Can the Government Compel Disclosures in Violation of Sincerely
Held Beliefs?
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, too, brought
to the fore disagreements about free speech.82 Writing for a five-justice majority,
Justice Thomas concluded that certain disclosure obligations imposed by
California on family-planning and pregnancy-related facilities to notify
individuals of abortion-related services violated the First Amendment because,
among other reasons, the law “target[ed] speakers, not speech, and impose[d]
an unduly burdensome disclosure requirement that [would] chill their protected
speech.”83 Unlike some of the laws the Court had upheld previously that touched
on “the practice of medicine” through compelled disclosures about the risks of
abortion and childbirth, Justice Thomas explained that the compelled notice in
Becerra “does not facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure” and “is not
tied to a procedure at all.”84
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito
and Gorsuch, authored a concurrence excoriating the law as “compel[ling]
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic

80

Id. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

81

Id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018) (“The
California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act
(FACT Act) requires clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to provide certain notices. Cal.
Health & Safety Code Ann. §123470 et seq. (West 2018). Licensed clinics must notify women
that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a phone
number to call. Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to
provide medical services. The question in this case is whether these notice requirements violate the
First Amendment.”).
82

83

Id. at 2378.

84

Id. at 2373 (citations omitted).
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philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”85 Castigating the
thought that requiring the disclosure of abortion-related services is productive,
Justice Kennedy made clear his view on what is “forward thinking”:
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment
as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian
government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that
history since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are
in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons
onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom
of speech for the generations to come. Governments must not
be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to
their deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures freedom of
thought and belief. This law imperils those liberties.86
Justice Breyer dissented for himself and three other justices.87 Justice Breyer
warned that the majority’s “constitutional approach threatens to create serious
problems” for most governmental regulation because “much, perhaps most,
human behavior takes place through speech and because much, perhaps most,
law regulates that speech in terms of its content.”88 Justice Breyer worried that
the majority “invites courts around the Nation to apply an unpredictable First
Amendment to ordinary social and economic regulation, striking down disclosure
laws that judges may disfavor, while upholding others, all without grounding
their decisions in reasoned principle.”89 “Even during the Lochner era,” Justice
Breyer continued, “when this Court struck down numerous economic regulations
concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative judgments
concerning the medical profession.”90 Empowering courts to strike down
laws on the basis of free speech, in the dissent’s view, has the perverse effect of
undermining free-speech precepts: “Using the First Amendment to strike down
economic and social laws that legislatures long would have thought themselves
free to enact will, for the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of
protecting freedom of speech.”91
Perhaps most interesting was Justice Breyer’s discussion on how to view
laws regulating messages about the availability of abortion-related services.

85

Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

86

Id.

Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In my view both statutory sections are likely
constitutional, and I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusions.”).
87

88

Id. at 2380.

89

Id. at 2381.

90

Id. at 2382.

91

Id. at 2383.
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After reviewing precedent enabling laws that compelled the disclosure of
information about adoption, he questioned “[i]f a State can lawfully require a
doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services, why should
it not be able, as here, to require a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking
prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion
services?”92 Invoking the axiom that “the rule of law embodies evenhandedness,”
Justice Breyer observed “what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the
gander.”93 Questioning the legitimacy of the majority’s argument that the law at
issue was not directed to a “medical procedure,” Justice Breyer was incredulous:
“Really? No one doubts that choosing an abortion is a medical procedure that
involves certain health risks.”94 “[A] Constitution that allows States to insist that
medical providers tell women about the possibility of adoption,” Justice Breyer
proposed, “should also allow States similarly to insist that medical providers tell
women about the possibility of abortion.”95

3. Can the President’s Exercise of Free Speech Circumscribe Executive Action?
Minutes after the Court released Becerra, it announced Trump v. Hawaii, which
asked whether political rhetoric by the president could be used to demonstrate
animus and deem unlawful certain executive actions on immigration.96 In another
5– 4 decision, Chief Justice Roberts reviewed presidential tweets and other
expressive media before concluding that President Donald J. Trump’s executive
orders about certain restrictions on immigrant entry into the United States
did not violate federal statutory law or the Establishment Clause.97 In separate
dissents authored by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, four of the justices saw the
representations in a different light, spotlighting something antithetical to the
promise of governmental religious neutrality.98

92

Id. at 2385.

93

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

94

Id. at 2386.

95

Id. at 2388.

96

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

Id. at 2417 (discussing “retweet[s],” “television interview[s],” and a published “Statement
on Preventing Muslim Immigration”).
97

See id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If this Court must decide the question without
this further litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious bias, including
statements on a website taken down only after the President issued the two executive orders
preceding the Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside. And for these reasons, I respectfully
dissent.”); id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By blindly accepting the Government’s misguided
invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group,
all in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous
logic underlying [Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)] and merely replaces one ‘gravely
wrong’ decision with another.”).
98
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Although the majority and two dissents debated the propriety of President
Trump’s statements and whether their provenance rested on animus against
minorities, those three opinions did not address the free-speech issues articulated
in a related lower-court opinion by Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski:
Candidates say many things on the campaign trail; they are
often contradictory or inflammatory. No shortage of dark
purpose can be found by sifting through the daily promises
of a drowning candidate, when in truth the poor shlub’s only
intention is to get elected. No Supreme Court case—indeed
no case anywhere that I am aware of—sweeps so widely in
probing politicians for unconstitutional motives. And why stop
with the campaign? Personal histories, public and private, can
become a scavenger hunt for statements that a clever lawyer can
characterize as proof of a -phobia or an -ism, with the prefix
depending on the constitutional challenge of the day.99
Judge Kozinski warned that “this path is strewn with danger” and “will chill
campaign speech.”100 Justice Kennedy, the justice for whom Judge Kozinski once
clerked, came the closest to attempting a détente between tolerating some leeway
in rhetoric with protection of individual rights.
In his last writing in an argued case, Justice Kennedy attempted to find “some
common ground between the opinions.”101 Justice Kennedy explained that “the
guarantee of freedom of speech” also provides “freedom of belief and expression”
among people:
There are numerous instances in which the statements and
actions of Government officials are not subject to judicial
scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials are
free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims
and protects. The oath that all officials take to adhere to the
Constitution is not confined to those spheres in which the
Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials
say or do. Indeed, the very fact that an official may have broad
discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution
and to its meaning and its promise.102

99
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
the denial of reconsideration en banc).
100

Id.

101

Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

102

Id. at 2424.
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He rested his pen with the admonition that “[a]n anxious world must know that
our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks
to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.”103

4. Can the Government Require Public Employees to Subsidize Unions?
The Court also revisited and—on the last day of the term104—overruled
precedent in the area of whether public employees can refuse to subsidize
union efforts to engage in collective bargaining.105 Janus v. AFSCME, Council
31 assessed whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education was correct to decide in
1977 that state governments could force non-union members, without abridging
their free-speech rights, to pay agency fees to public unions to support activity
germane to collective bargaining.106 Justice Alito, writing for a five-justice
majority, overruled Abood because the case “was poorly reasoned,” “led to practical
problems and abuse,” was “undermined by more recent decisions,” and accounted
“no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions . . . sufficient to justify
the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for
the past 41 years.”107 The Court granted certiorari to review the same issue in
2015, but divided equally after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia.108 This time,
however, a majority coalesced to conclude that it was impossible to split the atom
between subsidizing union political activities, which could not be compelled
under Abood, and union collective-bargaining efforts, which could be compelled
under Abood, because all public-employee union representation touches on
“sensitive political topics.”109
Justice Alito found dubious the foundation on which Abood rested, arguing
that “labor peace” would not dissolve in the absence of agency fees.110 In the
Court’s view, the public employee who brought the case “is not a free rider on
a bus headed for a destination that he wishes to reach but is more like a person

103

Id.

Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: A River Runs Through It, SCOTUSblog
(June 27, 2018, 6:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-ariver-runs-through-it/.
104

105
Matthew Forys, Symposium: Free Speech for Public Employees Restored—Justice Alito Plays
the Long Game, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2018, 10:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/
symposium-free-speech-for-public-employees-restored-justice-alito-plays-the-long-game/.
106
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
107

See id.

Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam) (affirming
decision below by equally divided Court).
108

109

See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2476.

110

Id. at 2465.
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shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.”111 Justice Alito also rejected originalist
arguments, impugning that “even if public employees enjoyed free speech rights,
the First Amendment was nonetheless originally understood to allow forced
subsidies like those at issue here.”112 The Court also considered the force of stare
decisis in this case, concluding that Abood “was wrongly decided and is now
overruled” because the decision had no constitutional foothold either today or
in 1977:
We recognize that the loss of payments from nonmembers may
cause unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the
short term, and may require unions to make adjustments in
order to attract and retain members. But we must weigh these
disadvantages against the considerable windfall that unions
have received under Abood for the past 41 years. It is hard to
estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation
of the First Amendment. Those unconstitutional exactions
cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.113
Justice Kagan led a four-justice dissent, arguing that “[r]arely if ever has the
Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this import—with so little regard
for the usual principles of stare decisis.”114 She defended Abood, asserting that
its “account of why some government entities have a strong interest in agency
fees (now often called fair-share fees) is fundamentally sound,” and that its
balance “between public employers’ interests and public employees’ expression
is right at home in First Amendment doctrine.”115 She aspersed the majority’s
analysis for failing to grapple with the pragmatic “interests of every government
entity that thinks a strong exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable
labor relations”:
But that response avoids the key question, which is whether
unions without agency fees will be able to (not whether they
will want to) carry on as an effective exclusive representative.
And as to that question, the majority again fails to reckon with
how economically rational actors behave—in public as well as
private workplaces. Without a fair-share agreement, the class
of union non-members spirals upward. Employees (including

111

Id.

112

Id. at 2471.

113

Id. at 2485– 86.

Id. at 2487 (Kagan, dissenting). Justice Sotomayor offered a one-paragraph dissent, which
explained her willingness to join in full the principal dissent.
114

115

Id. at 2489.
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those who love the union) realize that they can get the same
benefits even if they let their memberships expire. And as more
and more stop paying dues, those left must take up the financial
slack (and anyway, begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit
the union.116
She even accused the majority of creating a “sui generis,” “unjustified hole in
the law, applicable to union fees alone” because, in her view, precedent “allows a
government entity to regulate that expression in aid of managing its workforce
to effectively provide public services.”117 To buttress the argument in favor of
stare decisis, Justice Kagan referenced the “22 States, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico—plus another two States for police and firefighter unions,” all
of whom have “enacted statutes authorizing fair-share provisions.”118 The dissent
could have ended there. But it did not.
“There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion,” Justice Kagan explained, because
it “prevents the American people, acting through their state and local officials,
from making important choices about workplace governance.”119 She accused
the majority of “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes
judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”120
She, too, did not hold back in coloring the majority as “now bursting with pride
in pick[ing] the winning side in what should be—and until now, has been—an
energetic policy debate.”121 “The majority has chosen the winners by turning the
First Amendment into a sword,” Justice Kagan observed, and those justices are
“using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”122 The dissent also
touched on a theme espoused by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Becerra: “Speech
is everywhere—a part of every human activity (employment, health care,
securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory
policy affects or touches speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And at every
stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices.”123 Justice Kagan offered a
plaintive closing: “The First Amendment was meant for better things.”124

116

Id. at 2490–91.

117

Id. at 2497 (emphasis omitted).

118

Id. at 2499.

119

Id. at 2501.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id at 2502.

124

Id.
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5. October Term 2017 Closed with Frustration and Uncertainty
The Court released Janus on the last day of an acerbic term.125 Justice Kagan
read portions of her dissent from the bench, a statement for any justice and
a rare occurrence for her.126 Witnesses observed that her voice was “stern and
sometimes angry-sounding” as she spoke.127 By coincidence of a seniority-based
seating arrangement on the bench, Justice Alito, who sits immediately to her
left, “lean[ed] back in his chair and at times seem[ed] to be peeking over her
shoulder at her statement.”128 Just the day before, Justice Breyer read from the
bench portions of his dissent in Becerra and Trump, and Justice Sotomayor did
the same for her dissent in Trump.129 Hours later Justice Kennedy would announce
his retirement, accelerating a tailspin against consensus.130
Reviewing cases from October Term 2017, Professor Cass Sunstein
questioned the conventional wisdom that “[t]hose on the left used to like
freedom of speech—but now, not so much,” and that “those on the right used
not to like free speech—but now they’re all in.”131 Offering a revisionist view
that that “narrative is mostly wrong,” he argued that progressives long have
sought to protect “political dissenters,” “libel law,” and “prior restraints,” while
conservatives have sought to protect “corporate expenditures and commercial
speech” and expressed concern that speech could prove dangerous even if not
imminent; that “libelous speech could do real damage; [and] that in the Pentagon
Papers case national security was at risk.”132 “Neither the left nor the right has
really shifted,” he explained, because “[c]urrent free-speech battles don’t look
even a little bit like those of the 1950s and 1960s.”133 So “[i]t’s not hypocrisy,
and it’s not even surprising,” Professor Sunstein concluded, “if those on the left,

125
See Kedar Bhatia, Final October Term 2017 Stat Pack and Key Takeaways, SCOTUSblog
(June 29, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/final-october-term-2017-statpack-and-key-takeaways/ (“OT17 saw an uncommonly low level of unanimity.”); Kedar S. Bhatia,
Stat Pack for October Term 2017, SCOTUSblog 15–16, (June 29, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SB_Stat_Pack_2018.06.29.pdf.
126

Walsh, supra note 104.

127

Id.

128

Id.

Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: The “Court of History” Is in Session,
SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2018, 4:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/a-view-from-thecourtroom-the-court-of-history-is-in-session/.
129

Walsh, supra note 104 (“Roberts wishes all three well in their retirement. Kennedy has
taken this all in without betraying any hint of what is to come this afternoon.”).
130

Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, The Left and the Right, Consistent on Free Speech, Bloomberg
(July 5, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-05/free-speechdivides-the-left-and-the-right.
131

132

Id.

133

Id.
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long focused on the protection of political speech and dissent, are not so excited
about protecting commercial advertising, or about striking down disclosure
requirements from the Securities and Exchange Commission.”134
Against the discordant views among the justices, one additional case decided
that term touched on political discourse and represents hope of rekindling
consensus. In many ways, Lozman offered the Court an opportunity to return
to the edifications of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, which coalescence around
the idea that reasoned deliberation must be allowed to occur, if only so public
servants and the polity they serve can decide the merits of a debate.135

III. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
and the Promise of the Right to be Heard
A. Fane Lozman and His Second Trip to the Supreme Court
There are many sides to Fane Lozman: he is a two-time victor in the Supreme
Court, self-described “activist,” one-time owner of a floating house, and the
proud caretaker of a dachshund (“Lady”), parrot (“Stormy”), and cat (“Jet”), the
latter of whom apparently is capable of leaping “30 feet” in a single bound.136 He
also served in the U.S. Marine Corps, holds a patent on computer software, and
worked as a “zombie day trader” for a spell in Chicago.137 Some of his appellations
include “political gadfly, relentless opponent of public corruption, and bored rich
guy always spoiling for a fight.”138 As Macklemore would say, “[t]here’s layers to”
Lozman not unlike “tiramisu, tiramisu.”139

1. Lozman’s Arrival at Riviera Beach and the Birth of Two Supreme
Court Cases
Lozman, a native of Miami, purchased a floating house in 2002140 and moved
back to Florida in 2003.141 He docked the floating house in North Bay Village,
134

Id.

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135

136
First Mondays Podcast, OT2017 #30: “Most Ambitious Crossovers”, SCOTUSblog
01:22:00 (June 25, 2018, 8:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/ot2017-30-mostambitious-crossovers/.

Robert Barnes, A Florida Provocateur Has His Day Before the U.S. Supreme Court—Again,
Wash. Post (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/a-floridaprovocateur-has-his-day-before-the-supreme-court--again/2018/02/25/925c9c26-1595-11e88b08-027a6ccb38eb_story.html?utm_term=.93f2fac7dale.
137

138

See id.

139

Macklemore, Downtown, on This Unruly Mess I’ve Made (Macklemore, LLC 2015).

Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Defining a Houseboat—A House or a Boat?, SCOTUSblog
(Sept. 28, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/argument-preview-defining-ahouseboat-a-house-or-a-boat/.
140

141

Barnes, supra note 137.
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Florida, where he lived for three years.142 Hurricane Wilma damaged the house in
2005, which prompted Lozman to move 80 miles north to Riviera Beach.143 He
had the house towed and docked in a marina run by the City of Riviera Beach.144
He signed a lease with the city in March 2006, intending to live in the structure
indefinitely.145 Yet shortly upon his arrival, he learned of the city’s preparations to
sell the marina to private developers.146 Acrimony set in almost immediately.
Lozman became an active participant in local government, which no doubt
propelled a budding antagonistic relationship, testifying “more than 200 times” at
city-council meetings.147 Within two months of his residency, the city had already
forcibly removed him from a regularly scheduled meeting.148 The city council also
denied him access to a “special meeting” of the council to discuss, among other
topics, his status as a resident.149
In June 2006, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the city on allegations that it
had violated the state’s open-meetings law when the city council denied him access
to the special meeting.150 Later that month, the council held another closed-door
session, in part to discuss Lozman’s open-meetings lawsuit.151
A few months later, in September 2006, the city filed a lawsuit in state court,
seeking to evict Lozman’s floating house from the marina.152 Lozman successfully
asserted a free-speech retaliation defense, thereby thwarting the city’s efforts to
evict the structure from the marina.153
During another council meeting in November 2006, Lozman, as he had
done countless times before, made his way to the podium during the publiccomment, non-agenda portion of the meeting—but this time he experienced

142

Denniston, supra note 140.

143

See id.

144

See id.

145

See id.

146

See id.

Editorial, The Supreme Court Protects Even the Unruliest of Government Critics from
Retaliation, L.A. Times (June 20, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-scotusretaliate-20180620-story.html#.
147

148
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a slightly different reaction from the city.154 Less than a minute after he began
speaking, Riviera Beach City Council Chairperson Elizabeth Wade directed a city
police officer to remove Lozman from the podium.155 The episode was captured
on video.156 Lozman began his comments with no attempt to be conciliatory:
“As is typical, the Mayor and [another Councilperson] aren’t here during my
comments.”157 The council remained silent as Lozman proceeded: “The U.S.
Attorney’s Office has arrested the second corrupt local politician . . . former
Palm Beach County Commissioner Tony Masilotti.”158 Wade interjected to
stop him: “You will not stand up and go through that kind of . . . .”159 Lozman
interrupted and said, “Yes, I will.”160 Wade exclaimed, “No, you won’t.”161 After
Lozman continued his allegations, Wade called out, “Officer,” which prompted
Lozman to speak louder and continue on: “I am informing the citizens that two
County Commissioners . . . .” 162 After Officer Francisco Aguirre walked up to
the podium, Lozman inveighed against his removal: “Excuse me? I’m not walking
outside, I haven’t finished my comments.”163 Wade responded by directing, “Well,
carry him out.”164 “Why am I being arrested,” Lozman retorted, “I have a First
Amendment right!”165
At Wade’s direction, Officer Aguirre handcuffed Lozman, escorted him from
the meeting, and transported him to the police headquarters, where Lozman was
charged with disorderly conduct and trespass after warning.166 Lozman alleged
that city officials later altered the charging document “with a ‘white-out’ of the
trespass charge, and replacement with the words ‘resisting w/out violence, to wit
obstruction.’” 167 The state attorney dismissed all charges in January 2007.168
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In 2008, Lozman filed another pro se lawsuit against the city, alleging six
counts of constitutional violations, including a free-speech claim on grounds that
the city retaliated against him and a petition claim based on alleged interference
with Lozman’s right to petition the government for redress of grievances.169 The
case was assigned to Senior District Judge Daniel T. K. Hurley.170
Around the time Lozman filed that case, and after the city’s privatedevelopment project scuttled, the city imposed a new marina-docking agreement
with more stringent conditions, requiring that any vessel in the marina be fitted so
that it could be moved in an emergency.171 Lozman refused to sign the agreement,
which provoked an admiralty lawsuit filed by the city in 2009.172
Yet again as a pro se litigant, Lozman requested that the district court dismiss
the admiralty case for lack of jurisdiction because the floating house was not
a “vessel” consistent with admiralty law.173 The district court found in favor of
the city, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 2011.174 Upon court order,
Lozman sold the floating house at auction, which the city promptly purchased
and had destroyed.175
Lozman googled “appellate lawyers” after his losses at trial and on appeal,
finding Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation
Clinic, who agreed to represent him in the Supreme Court.176 The Court granted
certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit in 2012, and Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
concluded in 2013 that Lozman was correct to argue that the floating house was
not a vessel under admiralty law because “a reasonable observer, looking to the
home’s physical characteristics and activities, would not consider it to be designed
to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water.”177

2. The Unlikely Posturing of Another Grant of Certiorari
Just as the admiralty case began to simmer, Lozman’s civil-rights case started
to heat up. After a jury returned a verdict for the city in 2014, Lozman sought
a new trial, which the district court denied.178 Although not cited or relied on
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during the arrest or consideration of charges, the district court entered judgment
to the city because probable cause to arrest may have existed under a latent state
law, which “prohibits interruptions or disturbances in schools, churches, or other
public assemblies.”179 That latent law was one of three proposed alternatives
advocated by the city for the first time at trial.180
After litigating pro se at trial, Lozman secured counsel and appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.181 The appeals court affirmed the judgment in 2017 because,
among other reasons, the jury had found that the arresting officer had probable
cause to arrest Lozman, which under circuit precedent precluded plaintiffs
from prevailing on a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim if probable cause
justified the arrest.182 In another appeal from a separate order in the case, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed an award of roughly $35,000 in fees to the city, which
were assessed against Lozman.183 Lozman would later represent that the district
judge who assessed the fees against him “spent half the year in Europe.”184
After losing on the merits at trial and on appeal, Lozman discovered—
through his own research—a circuit split on the issue of whether the existence
of probable cause is sufficient to negate a free-speech retaliatory-arrest claim.185
He again enlisted the able counsel of Professor Fisher,186 and the Court again
granted certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit—this time on the non-admiralty
issue of “[w]hether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment
retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.”187 Lozman, perhaps colored by the
apparent advantages realized when he retained counsel, would later comment on
how pro se litigants in the courts before which he argued, unlike attorneys, are
relegated to hardcopy filing only and are unable to access cell phones for litigation
assistance during court sessions.188
179
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The parties at the merits stage took opposing views about the salience of
probable cause.189 Unlike a retaliatory-prosecution claim, which the Court has
concluded probable cause nullifies, Lozman argued that retaliatory arrests are
different.190 While prosecutors enjoy broad immunity from civil-rights lawsuits
in most circumstances, cities and police officers have much less protection.191
In addition, countenancing a probable-cause defense, Lozman explained,
also encourages government actors to shift positions from the initial arrest to
determine how best to defend a lawsuit.192 Lozman cited his own case as an
example in which the notice to appear listed two charges later dismissed, the
government proffered three new charges during litigation, and the trial court
ultimately asked the jury to consider whether probable cause existed for an offense
neither contemplated at arrest nor during charging.193 The city’s response to
Lozman’s arguments was simple: no constitutionally meaningful difference exists
between retaliatory prosecution and retaliatory arrest.194 “[A]rrests backed by
probable cause,” the city argued, “pose little danger to the freedom of speech.”195
The city also attempted to reassure the Court that, in practice, most officers are
already aware of free-speech freedoms when deciding to arrest.196 The Office of
the Solicitor General filed an unsolicited amicus brief in support of the city, and
then-Acting Solicitor General Jeffery B. Wall secured a portion of oral argument
to advocate the government’s position.197
Ahead of oral argument, Professor Heidi Kitrosser suggested that court
watchers should attend to “what extent, if at all, the justices’ questions reflect
recent events, such as the demonstrations and violence in Charlottesville, Virginia,
protests against President Donald Trump’s administration, and protests by Black
Lives Matter.”198 Lozman, too, offered public thoughts before oral argument: “If I
lose this case, it will be a sad day for our democracy. Our country will slide further
into a police state. . . . It sounds hokey, but this is kind of a noble battle to fight.”199
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City Council Chairperson Wade also offered public comments, which were more
directed to the city council’s relationship with Lozman than oral argument: “I
told him I would put my foot so far up his behind, he would think my toe was his
tonsil.”200 No love lost, for sure, between the litigants.
The Court heard the case in February 2018, with the justices expressing
concerns over how to prevent governments from exploiting the probable-cause
defense through post hoc rationalizations while also affording leeway to lawenforcement officers to make arrests without fear of lawsuits.201 On the one hand,
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the video of the arrest was “pretty chilling”:
“I mean, the fellow is up there for about 15 seconds, and the next thing he knows,
he’s being led off in—in handcuffs, speaking in a very calm voice the whole
time.”202 Justice Kennedy suggested the same: “[T]here is evidence that there was
a pre-determined plan to arrest somebody on account of his political speech in a
political forum. And it seems to me that this is a very serious First Amendment
problem.”203 Justice Kagan homed in on the facts and pragmatic consequences of
a decision in favor of the city:
[I]n a local government there are people who become real sorts of
pains to local officials, and—and local officials want to retaliate
against them. . . . And just the nature of our lives and the nature
of our criminal statute books, there’s a lot to be arrested for. . . .
So that’s a pretty big problem, it seems to me, and it’s right here
in kind of the facts of this case.204
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy also expressed concern over riot-type
situations in which the consequences would be lawsuits against arresting officers
simply because rioters insulted the police while committing violence.205 Stan
Dvoretzky, on behalf of the city, seized on these comments by arguing it is “critical
to understand that police officers must concededly take account of speech when
deciding to arrest in many situations,” and that it is “virtually impossible for
police officers . . . to disaggregate their own thought processes” and determine
the role played by arrestee’s speech in arrest decisions made in the middle of
violence.206 Several justices also suggested that probable cause might matter more
in instances in which the charged offenses are for more serious crimes, like rape and
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murder.207 Now in the capacity of deputy solicitor general, Wall acknowledged
that “the facts here are troubling,” but called it a “one-in-a-thousand” case
around which a rule ought not to be built.208 Pamela Karlan, arguing on behalf
of Lozman, pushed back, suggesting that adopting the rule of the city and federal
government would have the effect of saying that “all of the [First Amendment]
protections that this Court is giving don’t mean very much on the ground when
you’re dealing with local governments.”209 The decision answered some of these
questions, touched on others, and left others unresolved.210

B. Probable Cause Does Not Insulate Policymakers From RetaliatoryArrest Claims
1. A “Narrow” Decision on the Surface
The Court decided Lozman in June 2018, and its implicit message may
carry more constitutional significance than its explicit holding. Justice Kennedy,
joined by seven justices in his penultimate majority opinion, concluded that,
under circumstances like those presented by Lozman, a city cannot defeat a
civil-rights claim of retaliatory arrest for protected speech simply by pointing
to some additional basis on which it could have arrested the plaintiff.211 Justice
Kennedy began by observing that “[t]he issue before the Court is a narrow
one.”212 Perhaps the most important passage as to free speech came in the
opening paragraph of section two, when the Court observed what Lozman did
not challenge: “the constitutionality of Florida’s statute criminalizing disturbances
at public assemblies”; “that the statute is overly broad”; “that it impermissibly
targets speech based on its content or viewpoint”; “that it was enforced in a way
that curtailed Lozman’s right to peaceful assembly”; or “the validity of the City
Council’s asserted limitations on the subjects speakers may discuss during the
public-comment portion of city-council meetings.”213
Focusing on the question presented—“whether the existence of probable
cause bars that First Amendment retaliation claim”214—the Court determined
that a lawsuit brought against a city for a retaliatory policy directed against an
individual is not negated by probable cause because “the existence and enforcement
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of an official policy motivated by retaliation separates Lozman’s claim from the
typical retaliatory arrest claim.”215 “[W]hen retaliation against protected speech
is elevated to the level of official policy,” Justice Kennedy explained, “there is a
compelling need for adequate avenues of redress.”216 Justice Kennedy observed
that, unlike police officers and other government actors who can be dismissed
or punished, “there may be little practical recourse when the government itself
orchestrates the retaliation,” which “is a particularly troubling and potent form
of retaliation, for a policy can be long term and pervasive, unlike an ad hoc,
on-the-spot decision by an individual officer.”217 “Lozman’s speech is high in the
hierarchy of First Amendment values” because “right to petition is one of the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,” said Justice Kennedy.218
In vacating and remanding for further consideration, the Court cautioned
that relief is still uncertain for Lozman.219 The Court impugned whether a
reasonable juror could find that the city developed a retaliatory policy, that the
arrest was an official act by the city, or that the arrest would not have occurred
absent animus toward Lozman.220
In a solo dissent, Justice Thomas did not question the free-speech precepts of
the majority, yet he argued that probable cause should bar these types of claims
because of “the importance of probable cause when defining the torts of malicious
prosecution and malicious arrest.”221 Justice Thomas reasoned that “[t]he presence
of probable cause will tend to disprove that the arrest was done out of retaliation
for the plaintiff ’s speech, and the absence of probable cause will tend to prove
the opposite.”222 He closed by explaining that “officers almost always exchange
words with suspects before arresting them,” by which the majority’s rule will
“permit plaintiffs to harass officers with the kind of suits that common-law courts
deemed intolerable.”223
Professor Kitrosser reflected that the decision offers “some encouragement to
future plaintiffs,” “some warning to future defendants,” but “leaves much to be
determined.”224 Others had similar expressions of tacit sanguinity for Lozman:
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“In brief, Lozman won a battle Monday, but the war over his First Amendment
right to complain to local government officials goes on.”225 Lozman represented
that the decision got his lawsuit “to the 50-yard line,” but “the last couple of pages
of the opinion gave the Eleventh Circuit a road map to mess with [him] again.”226
Still the prospect of success on remand tells only part of the story.

2. A Reassuring Decision Between the Margins
A myopic focus on the outcome in Lozman overlooks a story that should
hearten anyone holding fealty to the values expressed by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, which seek to preserve the right to petition and deliberate through
political dissent. Even if the Eleventh Circuit continues to “mess” with Lozman,
a pathway exists for similar cases to succeed on merits and in the court of
public opinion.
The Court approbated that Lozman could have challenged the law under
which the city was operating through a variety of theories.227 The opening
paragraph of section two telegraphed how lawsuits can proceed and succeed when
the government uses sweeping laws to silence political discourse.228 Not even
the dissent suggested otherwise.229 And the Court reached almost unanimous
consensus in an area fraught with complications over how unbridled free
speech should be in modern society.230 While success in the courts is a benchmark
by which to measure litigation success, exogenous effects on society can be just
as powerful.
Following the decision, Lozman represented that he received “hundreds”
of emails and calls about government officials in other cities removing speakers
from public meetings under similar circumstances.231 After reading and listening
to individuals tell their stories, Lozman realized that his case gave political
dissenters “a tool to fight back” against “[e]lected officials [who] use police powers
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to harass” people from engaging in political commentary.232 Even Lozman,
when he made his triumphant return to a city-council meeting, recalled how
his presence alone purportedly “scared to death” the city council.233 Between the
surfacing of similar stories and the Riviera Beach city council’s realization that
political dissent cannot be stymied forever, a palpable shift in power can—and
possibly has—occurred. Those stories, if true, belie Justice Thomas’s gainsay “that
there will be many cases where this rule will even arguably apply.”234 The common
and consistent argument is plain no matter where you live: “If you don’t like being
criticized, don’t run for public office.”235
These social aftereffects are more than epiphenomenal because they are
concatenated to the idea that individuals can stand up to local government
with confidence that the courts will accept the proposition that government
officials cannot adopt censorship policies against disfavored speakers. Sure,
Lozman claimed to have celebrated by “hit[ting] the town a few times” after the
decision issued,236 but it is the self-confidence building in others and the behavior
adjustments of his city, not merely the decision alone, that are true causes for
celebration. Whatever the result of remand ultimately entails, the case is a victory
because of its effects writ large and writ small. And those effects represent a return
to the precepts edified in the early 20th century by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
which proclaim that free speech should be viewed as a search for truth, safety,
deliberation, and redress of grievances.237
To be sure, whether Justices Holmes and Brandeis would be right under an
originalist understanding of the Constitution has been the subject of renewed
debate.238 But if free-speech jurisprudence from the early 20th century is in tension
with and has no sure foothold in the original meaning of the First Amendment,
the question then becomes whether original meaning is the right way to resolve
issues of free speech?
In an article that Professor Sunstein professed “might well be the
most illuminating work on the original understanding of free speech in a
generation,”239 Professor Jud Campbell argued that the founding generation
232
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viewed political dissent with skepticism.240 Rather than take an absolutist view
of free-speech, Professor Campbell cites how the original public understanding
of the Constitution approved of laws like the Sedition Act of 1798, which made
evident that the concept of promoting the “public good” could provide the
government with authority to constrict “liberty to falsely call you a thief, a
murderer, an atheist.”241 Professor Sunstein explained that “[f ]rom the standpoint
of law in the 21st century, that’s plainly unconstitutional”; yet, as Professor
Campbell argued, “the founders meant to protect a lot less speech than most of
us think.”242 As one of the closest data points on what the public thought of free
speech in 1791, the Sedition Act of 1798 permitted fines and imprisonment for
writing, printing, uttering, or publishing “any false, scandalous, and malicious
writing against the government of the United States, or either House of
Congress, or the President, with intent to defame, or bring either into
contempt or disrepute, or to excite against either the hatred of the people of the
United States.”243
If Professor Campbell is correct, Lozman might not be consistent with the
original understanding of the First Amendment, but it falls gently within the
ideals championed in the Supreme Court for the first time by Justices Holmes
and Brandeis.244 And Lozman, if anything, seems less a departure from originalist
understanding than Janus and Becerra.245 Reaching back to a foothold from
English common law applied throughout the colonies, in Crown v. Zenger, a
jury in 1735 acquitted publisher John Peter Zenger on charges that he made
false statements against New York’s colonial governor, reflecting what has been
deemed a jury nullification largely attributed to the persuasion of Andrew
Hamilton’s oration that truth is the best defense against libel: “The laws of our
country have given us a right to liberty of both exposing and opposing arbitrary
power (in these parts of the world at least) by speaking and writing truth.”246
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Though not a constitutional case, the understanding of and commitment to
truth over governmental censorship is unavoidable. Lozman is—at a minimum—a
rebirth of “better things” from the 20th century and less inconsistent with first
principles than other 21st century cases.247
It has been described as “unprecedented” for an individual plaintiff to win
twice in the Supreme Court in two different cases addressing unrelated and
separate issues, especially in an era where the Court rejects around 7,000 cases
each year and hears only 80.248 Lozman, looking back on the journey, offered
the following: “This arrest happened in 2006 and the case was filed in February
2008, so we’ve been fighting this case for over 10 years. It’s been a Herculean
effort.”249 Regardless of whether Lozman wins on remand, he’s already won
by standing up for something he believes in, despite the awesome threat of
governmental punishment. And society is a winner for that too.

IV. Conclusion
If “[t]he First Amendment was meant for better things,” what are they?250
Precluding safe spaces on college campuses? Enabling unbridled campaign
contributions by foreign corporations? Preventing state universities from
discriminating against certain speakers based on perceived offensive content?
Facilitating deregulation? Those topics are not easy. But assuring people of their
ability to engage in political dissent should be. Among the controversial cases
decided during October 2017, Lozman’s lawsuit recalls some of the undisputed
values under which free speech has come to be understood. Although he did
not win on the merits, that the Court recognized certain vehicles to challenge
stifling action by the government is comforting and suggests engagement to
ensure public servants treat people better.
Lozman harks back to ideas now set adrift by more complex problems in
a modern society. Discovery of those elusive “better things” for which the
First Amendment was meant requires remembering what happened before,
understanding what worked, and anticipating what will work.251 Just as “we
beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past,”252 the
rallying points around which to stabilize government and society are “that truth
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is the only ground upon which [the people’s] wishes safely can be carried out”253
because “deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”254 That is the
freedom Lozman sought because “the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.”255 “That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution.”256 Channeling Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
Lozman summed up his accomplishment and the work still to be done: “I helped
move the bar forward on the First Amendment.”257 He sure did.
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